Multi-user wireless communications systems form competitive environments, where self-
interested users having different abilities to gather information and learn, compete for the limited 
spectrum resources. Existing multi-user communication solutions often result in inefficient 
resource allocation in such environments, because they usually assume transceivers which 
passively select their actions in response to the information they can gather about competing users. 
For a variety of communication scenarios, such passive system designs often lead to inefficient 
spectrum usage or even in a network collapse. 
We propose a methodology that transforms the non-cooperative game played among myopic 
users based on their private information into a Stackelberg game. Stackelberg equilibria of the 
Stackelberg game can potentially overcome the inefficiency of the Nash equilibria of the original 
game. For instance, in contention games, a particular type of Stackelberg intervention is 
constructed to show that any payoff profile feasible with independent transmission probabilities 
can be achieved as a Stackelberg equilibrium. We discuss criteria on how to select an operating 
point of the network and informational requirements for playing the Stackelberg game. As 
another example, in wideband power control games, we investigate how a foresighted user having 
its desired information should design its transmit power spectral density in order to play a 
Stackelberg equilibrium and improve its achievable rate. 
Finally, we show that both the Nash equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium are special cases 
of the conjectural equilibrium. We also develop practical algorithms to form accurate beliefs and 
select transmission strategies in order to attain desirable conjectural equilibrium.