This work focuses on joint cyber and physical attacks on power grids and presents methods to retrieve the grid state information following such an attack. We consider a model where an adversary attacks a zone by physically disconnecting some of its power lines and blocking the information flow from the zone to the grid’s control center. We use tools from linear algebra and graph theory, and leverage the properties of the DC power flow to develop methods for information recovery. Using information observed outside of the attacked zone, these methods recover information about the disconnected lines and the phase angles inside the attacked zone. We identify sufficient conditions on the zone structure and constraints on the attack characteristics such that these methods can correctly recover the information under the DC power flow model. We also study the problem of information recovery in the presence of measurement noise. We provide a method for information recovery in the noisy scenarios using second order cone programming. Finally, we briefly evaluate the performance of our methods when the state of the grid is given by the AC power flow model and show that our methods can be equally effective in recovering the state of the grid in this case.