We consider the problem of private information retrieval through a wiretap channel II (PIR-WTC-II). In PIR-WTC-II, a user wants to retrieve a message (or file) privately out of M messages, which are stored in N replicated and non-communicating databases. An eavesdropper observes different fractions of the traffic exchanged between the databases and the user. The databases should encode the returned answer strings such that the eavesdropper learns nothing about the contents of the databases. We aim at characterizing the capacity of the PIR-WTC-II under these joint privacy and security constraints. We show that the problem is fundamentally related to the PIR problem under asymmetric traffic constraints. We obtain an upper bound in the form of a max-min optimization problem. We propose an achievability scheme that satisfies the security constraint by encoding a secret key into an artificial noise vector using an MDS code. The upper bound and the lower bound match for the cases of M=2 and M=3 messages.