Future Internet designs call for increased security, performance reliability, social content distribution, mobility and distributed scalable resource allocation. Information-Centric Network (ICN) is one of the most promising solutions that can support the needs of the future Internet. The overarching goal of the research presented in this talk is to use game theoretical approaches for the design of ICNs.  We develop an analytical framework for distribution of popular content in an ICN that comprises of an Access ICN, a Transit ICN and a Content Provider. Using a generalized Zipf distribution to model content popularity, we devise a game theoretic approach to jointly determine caching and pricing strategies in such an ICN. Under the assumption that the caching cost of the access and transit ICNs is inversely proportional to popularity, we show that the Nash caching strategies in the ICN are 0-1 (all or nothing) strategies. Further, for the case of symmetric Access ICNs, we show that the Nash equilibrium is unique and the caching policy (0 or 1) is determined by a threshold on the popularity of the content (reflected by the Zipf probability metric), i.e., all content more popular than the threshold value is cached. We also show that the resulting threshold of the Access and Transit ICNs, as well as all prices, can be obtained by a decomposition of the joint caching and pricing problem into two independent caching only and pricing only problems.